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COMMENTS
Mandatory Maternity Leave Policy in the School Systems
- A Survey of Cases
N ALMOST ALL SOCIETIES birth seems to have been cul-
turally converted into a very much more complex, diffi-
cult, and handicapping process than it in fact is. In general
it would seem that the more complex a society becomes, the
more it tends to complicate the process of birth; . . . In
some nonliterate societies some women take much less than
[four or five days] to return to their normal household
chores. In food-gathering cultures, such as those of the
Bushman of South Africa and the Australian Aborigines,
the fact that a woman is pregnant or that an hour ago
she gave birth to a child is generally responsible for no de-
viation whatever from her customary manner of living,
except for the additional task of nursing.'
Thus, it has been suggested that mandatory maternity leave
regulations, which are in force in many American school systems
today, are a ". . . manifestation of [this] cultural sex role condi-
tioning . ... " It is only recently that the power of the school
boards to make these rules requiring teachers to take leaves of
absence after a certain month of pregnancy have been challenged
in our courts. The first two cases raising this issue were La Fleur
v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.3 and Cohen v. Chesterfield County School
Bd.4 in May 1971. Since then, there have been a steady flow of
cases testing the legality of these regulations.
The school board regulations in question not only affect the
time when a pregnant teacher must leave her teaching duties, but
they also stipulate a period after childbirth when the teacher can
return and a means of reassignment. Notice of pregnancy to the
school board is also normally required by these regulations. The
time period of the leave varies with each school system. Generally,
school systems require their teachers to take leave of absence after
their fifth month of pregnancy and require them to return not
'A. MONT GU, THE NATURAL SUPERIORITY OF WOMEN 32 (8th ed. 1967) ; see Heath v.
Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F.Supp. 501, 505 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
zHeath v- Westerville Bd_ of Educ., 345 F.Supp. 501, 505-06 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
3326 F.Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), petition for
cert. filed 41 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1972) (No. 777).
4326 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), afl'd, 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972), rev/d on rehear-
ing, . F.2d ------ (4th Cir. 1973).
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earlier than two or three months after the child is born, all with-
out pay. Reassignment is usually to a vacancy for which the teacher
is qualified.
The only issue that the courts have really dealt with is the right
of the school board to set a time when the pregnant teacher must
take her leave of absence. This right has been upheld in Cerra v.
East Stroudsburg Area School Dist.,' by the lower court in La Fleur
v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,' and upon rehearing in Cohen v. Chester-
field County School Bd. by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
sitting en banc.8 In all other cases, the courts have found the school
board regulations unconstitutional as a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. (La Fleur has been
reversed on appeal.') Although the trend seems to be that man-
datory maternity leave regulations enacted by the school systems
are unconstitutional, it is unfair to conclude that they are uncon-
'An example of some of the maternity leave provisions of the school boards arc as follows:
Amster v. Board of Educ., 55 Misc. 2d 961, 286 N.Y.S. 2d 687, 689 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1967), teacher could not teach after four months of pregnancy and could return
six months after confinement; Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F.Supp. 155, 157 (N.D. Ill.
1972), teacher could not teach past her sixth month of pregnancy and could not return
until child was two months old; Cerra v. East Stroudsburg School Dist., 3 Pa. Cmwlth. 665,
285 A.2d 206, 207 (1971), teacher could not teach beyond her fifth month of pregnancy;
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F.Supp. 1159, 1160 (F.D. Va. 1971), Iff'd,
467 F.2d 262 (4th Cit. 1972), revd on ebearing, F.2d - (4th Cit. 1973), teacher
could not teach past her fifth month of pregnancy, but this could be extended by the school
board; Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F.Supp. 501, 503-04 (S.D. Ohio 1972),
teacher could not teach past her fifth month of pregnancy and could not return until the
child was a year old; La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd, of Educ., 326 FSupp. 1208, 1209-10 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), rev'd, 461 F.2d 1184 (6th Cit. 1972), teacher could not teach past her
fourth month of pregnancy and could not return earlier than three months after childbirth;
Pocklington v. The Duval County School Bd. 345 F.Supp. 163, 164 (M.D. Fla. 1972),
teacher could take her maternity leave not later than five full months prior to her expected
date of confinement, Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F.Supp. 438,
43940 (N.D. Cal. 1972), teacher must leave her teaching duties at least two months before
expected date of birth and could not return until one month after childbirth.
3 Pa. Cmwlth. 665, 285 A.2d 206 (1971).
7 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cit. 1972).
'326 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cit- 1972), vev'd on rehear-
ing, ....... F.2d ------ (4th Cir. 1973)_ On January 15, 1973, the decision in Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Bd. was reversed upon rehearing by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals sitting en bane. In a divided decision, Judge Haynesworth wrote the majority
opinion which is almost verbatim from his dissenting opinion when this court heard this
case previously, The court sees two reasons why the Chesterfield County School District's
maternity leave policy should be upheld. First, they find that this maternity leave policy is
not an invidious discrimination based upon sex. Judge Haynesworth sees pregnancy and
maternity as sui generis end does not equate them to other physical disabilities. Secondly,
this court finds that it is the school board's responsibility to maintain continuity in the
classroom, thus they have the right to set a reasonable date for the commencement of ma-
ternity leaves. The necessity of this policy was further illustrated by this court as they note
that eighty percent of the teachers in the Chesterfield County school system are women.
The La Flour case was reversed July 27, 1972 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.
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stitutional per se.10 Even though all of these regulations have failed
as being a violation of the equal protection clause, the arguments
have varied and there are still many questions that have been left
open for future decisions. In addition, Congress has recently amended
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include public schools.11 Thus a
teacher can now bring action under Title VII of this Act, which
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. 2 In
order to fully understand the impact of the various decisions con-
cerning mandatory maternity leave for teachers, a detailed survey
of what has happened in the courts will follow.
Fourteenth Amendment and Sex Discrimination Cases
In 1905, in the case of Lochner v. New York,"2 the Supreme
Court struck down a New York statute regulating hours in bakeries
as being ". . . an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interfer-
ence with the right and liberty . . . to contract .... ,14 There was
recurring due process language in this case as the court discussed
means rationally related to an end and a legitimate end, although
the equal protection argument was never used. Three years later,
the Lochner decision was limited to regulating the number of work-
ing hours for women in Muller v. Oregon.u5 The Supreme Court
found that the state's power to regulate the working hours for
women rested on its police power and the right to preserve the
health of women and was not at all affected by women's right to
contract. This was the first case where the legislative classification
for women was sustained by the courts in a right to work case.
After the Muller decision, other challenged legislation involving
classification according to sex was held valid and constitutionally
permissible by the courts. 6 The equal protection argument, though,
1D The author perceives this recent decision, not as a reversal of a trend invalidating mandatory
maternity leave policy in the school districts, but as a further indication that this entire area
remains unsettled, and will probably remain so until the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on
the issue.
1 Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Star. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (1970).
1242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), as amended, (1972). "It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privilcges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex . . . or (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual or employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex
. ,,id.
11 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
1' Id. at 45.
is208 U.S. 412 (1908).
"1 Some cases that followed the Muller decision that upheld statutes restricting working hours
for women and providing minimum wages for women were: Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236
U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S.
292 (1924); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
[Vol. 22:172
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was not used until 1948 in Goesaert v. Cleary," where the courts
were determining the validity of a Michigan statute that allowed
only wives and daughters of bar owners to act as bartenders. The
court upheld the statute as valid and Frankfurter, delivering the
opinion of the court, stated that "[t]he Constitution does not require
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social stand-
ards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest
scientific standards.'"'0 The use of the equal protection argument
did not alter the situation for women as laws based on sex classi-
fication continued to be upheld by the courts.19 Thus, the courts were
still recognizing two distinct classes - men and women. The historic
breakthrough in sex discrimination cases came in 1971 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Reed.2 ° Here the court found
that an Idaho statute giving preference to men over women in ad-
ministering decedent's estates was violative of the equal protection
clause. This was the first time that the Supreme Court ever in-
validated a state statute involving classification by sex using the
equal protection argument. Because of this decision, the courts are
willing to apply the equal protection argument to the mandatory
maternity leave cases to determine whether sex discrimination has
taken place.
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution states that "No
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 21 It must be realized that laws are usually
enacted to protect or regulate a class of persons or property, and
therefore are often inherently unequal. Consequently, the courts
have set up a test of reasonableness to determine whether legisla-
tion is in violation of the equal protection clause."
The traditional test for reasonableness sets up three standards.
First, the classification must be based on a necessary and unarbi-
17335 U.S. 464 (1948).
lid. at 466.
19 Examples of statutes upheld under the equal protection clause involving sex dassification;
Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F.Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966), afl'd in 406 F.2d 883 (8th Cit.
1969), cart. den. 396 U.S. 862 (1969); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Miskunas
v. Union Carbide Corporation, 399 F.2d. 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 1066
(1969).
2404 US. 71 (1971).
n U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This constitutional guaratee is made possible through the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 stated in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides that "Every
person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
SLirsdsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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trary distinction ("rational basis").23 Next, the classification must
have a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose.24
Finally, all persons within the class must be treated equally. 25 When
using this traditional test, there is a presumption that the legisla-
tion is reasonable. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the assailing party
to show that the classification is arbitrary and unreasonable. 6
A stricter test is used by the courts where the classification in-
volves a fundamental right, such as voting,27 or a suspect class, such
as race." Here the classification must not only be reasonable but
there must also be a compelling government interest in enacting the
classification. There is no presumption that the classification is rea-
sonable, so the burden of proof lies with the defendant to show that
a compelling government interest exists.
29
To date, only two courts have found sex as a suspect classifica-
tion, thereby justifying the use of the stricter test. The California
Supreme Court, in Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby,3 applied the strict
standard of review in determining whether a statute prohibiting
women from tending bar, with certain exceptions, violated the equal
protection clause of the State and Federal Constitution. They found
two reasons why sex should be a suspect of class: 1) Sex, like race
and lineage, is a category into which one is born and frequently
bears no relation to ability to perform; 2) Similar to blacks, there
is a stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship associated
with women. 1 In U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. York, 32 the court granted
a female prisoner's petition for habeas corpus, where it was found
that a statute prescribed an indefinite sentence of specified minimum
duration for women felons, while there was no such rule for men.
In applying the compelling government interest test, the court found
no reason why adult women should have less protection as a class
than a racial group.33
The courts' reluctance to apply the stricter standard to sex
discrimination cases is understandable, although not justifiable, as
23McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493 (1927).
24F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
251d.
'Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
27 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
2 fHunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
29Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
30485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).
31 ld. at 540.
22281 F.Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
13Id. at 14.
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it is only recently thaL women have been recognized to be entitled
to equal rights with men by the judicial system. In some of the
mandatory maternity leave cases the possibility of applying the
stricter standard has been discussed, but it has never been used.
Thus, the question of whether to consider the right to work and the
right to bear children as fundamental rights has been eluded to by
the courts in these decisions. Therefore, in all the mandatory ma-
ternity leave cases brought under the fourteenth amendment, the
plaintiff teacher has had the burden of proving that the school board
regulations were arbitrary and unreasonable.
Mandatory Maternity Leave Cases Involving the School Boards
Prior to May, 1971, the courts took little notice of mandatory
maternity leave policies. In 1967, in a New York court, a teacher
challenged a school board rule that required a teacher to stay at
home for six months following the birth of her child." The court
upheld the rule as justified for administrative ease. The Federal
Court for the Western District of Texas, in February of 1971, in
Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n.,11 awarded back pay and
injunctive relief for reemployment to an employment interviewer
for the commission. Unlike the school board cases, Mrs. Schattman
brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
well as under the equal protection clause. Under Title VII, the em-
ployer has the burden of showing that the policy "is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise."36 At this time the court
found that the Texas Employment Commission had not sustained
the burden of showing that Mrs. Schattman would not be able to
perform her job safely and efficiently and that her employment was
terminated because of a condition attendant to her sex. This case
was later reversed as the court found that the Texas Employment
Commission was not an employer as defined under Title VII, 31 and
that the maternity leave policy was reasonable." The Schattman
case can be distinguished from the school board cases as Mrs. Schatt-
man was an office worker and the commission's maternity leave
"Amster v. Board of Educ., 55 Misc.2d 961, 286 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1967).
35330 F.Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
"142 U.S.C. I 2000e(b) (1970); "The term 'employer' ... does not include . .. a State
or political subdivision thereof . . see Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459
F.2d 32 (5th Cit. 1972); petition for cert. denied, 41 U.S.I.W. 3376 (U.S. Jan 8, 1973)
(No. 474).
3, The commission brought in medical testimony to the effect that releasing a woman after
her seventh month of pregnancy was reasonable. The court also felt that they only had to
treat men and women equally if they were similarly situated. They found that pregnant
women and men were not similarly situated.
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policy allows them to work until the end of their seventh month of
pregnancy.
The challenge by teachers as to the constitutionality of man-
datory maternity leave policies began with La Fleur v. Cleveland
Bd. of Edue3' and Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd.0 Both
cases had almost the identical facts, but the courts reached opposite
results.
In La Fleur, the school board contended that its mandatory
maternity leave regulation was enacted to protect the teacher and
to maintain continuity in the classroom.41 The board had adopted its
maternity leave policy in the early 1950's because of numerous re-
ports of children pointing, giggling, laughing, and making snide
remarks causing interruption in the classroom. There were instances
where a teacher refused to quit teaching until she practically gave
birth in the classroom. The board also discussed the increased
violence in the Cleveland schools. This seemed to be the distinguish-
ing factor between this case and all the following cases; howe er,
one must question whether a man or woman who is not pregnant
is safer in the Cleveland schools than a pregnant woman. In dis-
cussing the health of a pregnant teacher, the board brought in
evidence that complications could arise during the late months of
pregnancy and that the resulting effects could be serious. It was
further shown that pregnant women urinate more during their last
months of pregnancy and that the woman's agility is impaired
during this time also.
Mrs. La Fleur, seeking a permanent injunction, attempted to
convince the court that there had been a violation of her funda-
mental rights and that the stricter compelling government interest
test should be used. The court rejected this argument on the basis
that the rights weigh more heavily with the students. Consequently,
the court adopted the traditional reasonable basis test in determin-
ing whether the school board's policy was in violation of the equal
protection clause. In sustaining the school board's rule, the court
held: 1) The regulations were reasonable. 2) No discrimination as
to women whose condition is attendant to their sex existed. 3) There
was reasonable basis for the rule. 4) There was no violation of any
constitutional rights. 5) The regulation in question furthers the
design for quality education and serves the important interests of
students implementing this fundamental right.42 Thus, the court felt
39326 F.Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
40 326 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972), tev'd on rehear-
ing, _- _ F.2d -------- (4th Cit. 1973).
41 326 F.Supp. 1208, 1211 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
'lid. at 1213-14.
[Vol. 22 :172
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that the distractions, the teacher's health and the violence in the
schools were all valid concerns of the school board in making its
policy.
In a decision five days after the La Fleur case was decided, the
U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia found the
Chesterfield County School Board's mandatory maternity leave rule
discriminatory and without rational basis.43 In Chesterfield County,
unlike Cleveland, the termination date could be extended by the
superintendent of the schools upon recommendation from the teach-
er's physician and her principal. Mrs. Cohen requested an extension
so she might teach until the end of her eighth month of pregnancy.
Her request was denied by the school board because they had a
replacement available for the position. Mrs. Cohen thus brought this
action asking for back pay and the status she would have had had
she been allowed to teach until the end of her eighth month of
pregnancy. The court here, unlike the court in the La Fleur case,
rejected the health and safety argument by the defendant on the
basis that there was no empirical data to back it up. In fact, it was
stated that a pregnant teacher would be more likely to be inca-
pacitated during her early months of pregnancy than her later
months. The court went on to say, "since no two pregnancies are
alike, decisions of when a pregnant teacher should discontinue work-
ing are matters best left up to the woman and her doctor."" It must
also be noted that the Chesterfield County School System is located
in a predominantly rural area, so the Board was not faced with the
violence in its schools as in the Cleveland school system. An addi-
tional argument was raised in Cohen by the defendant school board
that was not raised in the La Fleur case. The defendant argued
that since the instant case was solely a matter of contract between
parties, Mrs. Cohen waived her constitutional rights when she
signed her employment contract. The court also rejected this argu-
ment. In deciding that this school board's policy had no rational
basis, the court found that because the school board treated preg
nancy differently than other medical disabilities, it was violative of
the equal protection clause. Mrs. Cohen was awarded her back salary
for three months and her seniority had she been able to continue
teaching until the end of her eighth month of pregnancy.
The next few cases that appeared in the courts concerning man.
datory maternity leave did not attempt to invalidate the regulations,
but questioned certain issues relating to maternity leave. About the
same time La Fleur and Cohen were decided, a California court
ruled that a pregnant teacher could not use accrued sick leave when
413 Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971).
" d. at 1160.
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on maternity leave,45 even though the county had an ordinance allow-
ing a male employee to use sick leave when his child was born. The
court found that this difference of treatment was not violative of
the equal protection clause. Three months later, a Washington Su-
perior Court, quoting the district court's majority opinion in Cohen,
held that where a teacher was denied reemployment after a maternity
leave, she was discharged without due process." The school board
policy provided that a teacher was only entitled to preference as to
vacancies when she returned, not guaranteed reemployment.
In Jinks v. Mays," an untenured teacher sought an injunction
against a school board where mandatory maternity leave was
granted only to tenured teachers. The injunction was granted, find-
ing that the board's policy was arbitrary and not relevant to the
Georgia Teachers Tenure Act, as the only distinction the court
found was "maternity." Mrs. Jinks was later awarded attorneys
fees by the United States District Court, Northern District of
Georgia, even though she never requested reemployment or rein-
statement after the birth of her child.
4
Although not involving a school board, the next case challeng-
ing a maternity regulation was Struck v. Secretary of Defense.41
Here the Ninth Circuit upheld an Air Force regulation requiring
discharge from the Service of any woman officer who becomes preg-
nant. This case holds little precedent for any of the school board
cases, as the rationale for the decision seemed to be that "judges
are not given the task of running the Army."5 0 None of the Consti-
tutional arguments were accepted, reasoning that the hospital was
in a combat zone and the nurse might suffer a miscarriage; how-
ever, the court failed to discuss the possibility of moving the nurse
to another hospital. After giving birth to her child, Susan Struck
gave the child up for adoption, and has recently been reinstated by
the Air Force.1
45 Lombardo v. County of Sonoma, Civil No. 65815 (Cal. Super Ct.. Sonoma County, May 21,
1971), See Koontz, Childbirth and Childrearing Leave: Job Related Benefits, 17 N.Y.L.
FORUM 480 (1971).
40Truax v. Edmonds School Dist. #15, Docket No. 107915 (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish
County, July 30, 1971), See Koontz, Childbirth and Childrearing Leave: Job Related Bene-
fits, 17 N.Y.L. FORUM 480 (1971).
47 32 P.Supp 254 (N.D, Ga. 1971), afi'd in part, 464 F.2 1223 (5th Ci. 1972).
48 - F.Supp ....... (N.D. Ga. 1972).
11460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971).
'
51d. at 1376.
n Memo for respondent suggesting mootness, (Dec. 1972). The case has recently been vacated
and remanded to the Court of Appeals (9th Cir.) to decide the issue of mootness, 41 U.S.
L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1972).
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Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District 2 involved the
same issue that faced the courts in the La Fleur and Cohen cases.
The Pennsylvania court found the school board's regulation barring
teachers from teaching beyond their fifth month of pregnancy reason-
able, refusing, in a short opinion, to be persuaded by Cohen and La
Fleur. Here the teacher argued that pregnancy was an illness and
that it would be discriminatory to treat it otherwise. Unfortunately,
the teacher's own medical expert testified otherwise, stating that
pregnancy was physiological. The court felt that since Mrs. Cerra
could show no other Pennsylvania case where pregnancy was treated
as an illness or any other reason why the regulations was unreason-
able, the regulation had to stand. If the plaintiff in this case had
brought in good evidence to counter the board of education's evi-
dence or had supported another type of treatment for maternity
leave, this case might had been decided differently.
In an excellent opinion, the district judge in Williams v. San
Francisco Unified School District 3 invalidated that school board's
maternity leave policy. The plaintiff in contending that the policy
was arbitrary and discriminatory focused her argument on the point
that among all illnesses or physiological conditions, the District had
singled out pregnancy for restrictive provisions. This was the point
that the district court in Cohen had used in turning that case for
the plaintiff teacher. The teacher here went into greater detail than
Mrs. Cohen by arguing that all other leaves of absence did not
begin until the employee desired it or because of medical necessity.
These other leaves of absence were paid leaves, while mandatory
maternity leaves were not. The plaintiff here produced two medical
testimonies that supported her claim that medically she was able
to work until the date of delivery. The defendant school district con-
tended that they were not discriminating against women because
women far advanced in pregnancy were a permissible category to
regulate. They also raised the health and safety argument, stating
that the injury-prone nature of pregnant women increased the dis-
trict's chance of tort-liability. The health and safety argument in
La Fleur was argued differently. There the court stated that the
school board was trying to protect the teacher while in William8 the
school district was concerned about the possibility of tort-liability.
The court in deciding Williams not only answered the defend-
ants' issues, but went further in answering others not raised. They
found that there was no increased tort-liability as the teacher was
still held to a "reasonable man" standard of care. It has also been
contended by ether school boards, although not in this case, that
52285 A.2d 206 (Pa. Cmwlth Ct. 1971).
53340 F.Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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allowing women to decide when they would want to take their
maternity leave would cause administrative problems. The Williams
court believed that it is easier to plan for a substitute teacher when
a teacher decides to leave fur maternity purposes than for someone
who unexpectedly becomes ill. The opinions of the husband of the
pregnant teacher were considered for the first time in this case. The
court felt that if a husband wanted his wife to take a maternity
leave, it should be at their option when it should begin. In striking
down the San Francisco school board's policy, the court stated that
"the methods of dealing with pregnancy are draconian with respect
to the disabilities posed thereby . [and the objectives of the school
board] could be served by means less restrictive than those now
employed."54
The cases that follow Williams to the present time have not
raised any new arguments in favor of invalidating mandatory ma-
ternity leave in the school systems. In Pocklington v. Duval County
School Rd.,55 after considering past decisions, the court turned the
case in favor of the plaintiff after the school board failed to supply
medical testimony in favor of their mandatory maternity leave policy.
The teacher in this case, furnished the necessary medical testimony
that a pregnant teacher could work until delivery.
In Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ.,6 the board presented no
persuasive evidence to the court that its mandatory maternity leave
policy was medically, psychologically, or administratively justified.
This was the first case that discussed the possibility of sex as a
suspect classification. The court continued by stating that since the
board had failed to satisfy the traditional reasonableness test, it
would not have to decide the issue of whether sex was a suspect class.
Ironically, it seems the court here has shifted the burden of proof
to the board of education to prove its policy as reasonable, even
though the court has employed the traditional test.
Soon after this case was decided, an Illinois court instructed
the Chicago Board of Education to treat mandatory maternity leave
as it treats other sick leave in respect to sick pay, seniority, and
placement for returning.57 The Illinois court raised similar argu-
ments as in the past. This was the first decision that required the
school board to revise its regulations to include sick pay. La Fleur
54Id. at 449.
SS345 F.Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
56345 F.Supp. 501 (S.D Ohio 1972).
57Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F.Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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has recently been reversed on appeal, 59 but the Cleveland Board of
Education in attempting to uphold its mandatory maternity leave
policy has petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.59 The
decision in the Cohen case was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court
but recently has been reversed upon rehearing." This is where
mandatory maternity leave policies in the school systems stand today
in the courts.
Conclusion
The school boards have basically raised three arguments in
favor of mandatory maternity leave: 1) administrative convenience;
2) medical safeguards; 3) safety of teacher (liability of school board).
The administrative argument has failed as the courts have found
that it is easier to find substitute teachers for a pregnant teacher
who gives some notice than for a teacher who unexpectedly becomes
ill. Medical testimony has shown that if there are no complications,
a teacher can perform her duties until delivery. In fact, it seems
that the first months of pregnancy are often more dangerous than
the last months of pregnancy. It also appears that the school boards
are having difficulty finding medical testimony to support their ma-
ternity leave policy. Thus, the medical argument, too, has failed as
the courts have accepted the lower court's decision in Cohen, that
no two pregnancies are alike and that it should be the teacher's
decision (with her doctor's approval) when she should quit work-
ing. The safety argument has not won much support in the courts
as no school board has brought in conclusive evidence that preg-
nant teachers are more accident prone, and thus more likely to
subject the board to increased tort liability.
The teachers, on the other hand, have brought in medical evi-
dence to substantiate their claims that they can work until delivery.
The most convincing argument posed by the teachers is that man-
datory maternity leave is discriminatory as it is distinguished from
all other sick leaves and all other leaves of absence without rational
basis.
'8La Fleur v. Cleveland Ed. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972). The Court of Appeals
in finding the Cleveland Board of Education's Mandatory Maternity leave policy arbitrary
and unreasonable in its overbreadth quoted from the school board's own medical testimony
where the doctor stated that he didn't always advise his pregnant patients to stop working.
The court could not conclude from the medical evidence presented any medical reason why
the board's maternity leave policy should be upheld.
They also stated that basic rights involved in the employment relationship would not
be relinquished because of possible embarrassment in the classroom. it was also noted by
this court that pregnant students were allowed to continue attending classes without any
detriment to the educational system.
59Poition for cer filed, 41 US.LW 3311 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1972) (No. 777).
60Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972), revd on -rehear-
ing .. .... F.2d ..----- (4th Cit. 1973). See, discussion in notes 8 and 9.
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Thus far, during the past year and a half since the lower court
decisions in La Fleur and Cohen, there has been a great victory in
the courts for teachers in invalidating mandatory maternity leave
provisions." There is no guarantee that the courts will continue to
construe mandatory maternity leave policies by the school boards as
unconstitutional ;62 a court could easily accept the position in Cerra
and not use any of the past cases as precedent for their decision. A
Supreme Court ruling could help rectify the problem.
Also, many questions have not been answered, as most courts
have only ruled on the issue of when a teacher can resign but not
on the questions of reemployment and sick pay, which are not yet
equivalent to other leaves of absence. The Chicago Board of Educa-
tion was the only school system that was forced to treat maternity
leave the same as all other sick leaves. 3 The Washington Superior
Court, in Truax v. Edmonds School District," was the only court
that dealt with the reemployment problem. It must also be con-
sidered that many school systems are still maintaining their man-
datory maternity leave policy where it is not being challenged in
a court.
The future for striking out mandatory maternity leave policies
from school boards' regulations looks even better now that Congress
has amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make it
applicable to public schools. Although Title VII has never been
used by teachers in this situation, it is a potential vehicle to in-
validate these rules. Teachers are now able to bring suit under Title
VII and it will be incumbent upon the school board to show that the
pregnant teacher cannot carry out the duties of her job efficiently
and safely. Looking at the Schattman decision, where the lower
court found that the Texas Employment Commission was covered
by Title VII, its maternity leave policy failed as not being a bona
fide occupational qualification. On appeal, where the fourteenth
amendment argument was argued, the court found the commission's
regulation reasonable and valid. This might suggest that a teacher
would have a better chance of winning in court if she brings an
action under Title VII, rather than under the fourteenth amendment.
61 How "great" this victory has been is now called into question by virtue of the recent reversal
upon reheating in Cohen. See, notes 8 and 9.
' See notes 8 and 9.
13Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F.Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
4Docket No. 107915 (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish County, July 30, 1971), see Koontz,
Childbirth and Childrearing Leave: Job Related Benefits 17 N.Y.L. FORUM 480 (1971).
"Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Star. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (1970).
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In respect to Title VII, Congress appears to have enacted this law
as a means to eliminate arbitrary sex classification. The Guidelines
on Sex Discrimination Because of Sex adopted by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission specifically outlaw mandatory
maternity leave regulations in Section 1604.10(a), which states "A
written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes
from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is
in prima facie violation of Title VII,'" 6 and in Section 1604.10(b),
requiring employers to treat disabilities caused by childbirth and
pregnancy like other temporary disabilities. 6 7 It can only be hoped
that the judiciary will adopt the attitude of the legislature toward
sex discrimination by invalidating mandatory maternity leave reg-
ulations challeneged in the courts in the future.
Phyllis Elayne Marcust
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